My Big Fat Greek Divorce – The Collateral-Order Exception to the Final Judgment Rule
The Law Court typically may only consider an appeal of a “final judgment”—that is, a decision that fully decides and disposes of the parties’ entire case and leaves no further questions for consideration. However, this “final judgment rule” is subject to exceptions which, under certain circumstances, may allow a party to bring an appeal on an interlocutory basis. This blog has previously explored exceptions to Maine’s final judgment rule here, here, and here.
In October of 2025, in Xamplas v. Xamplas, 2025 ME 92, the Law Court considered one such exception to the final judgment rule, known as the “collateral-order exception.” The collateral-order exception applies when “(1) the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation; (2) it presents a major unsettled question of law; and (3) it would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review.”
Xamplas involved a divorce and child custody dispute between Peter Xamplas, a citizen of Greece, and Michele Xamplas, a citizen of the United States. In November of 2022, Peter, Michele, and their minor child travelled from their home in Greece to the United States for an extended vacation. At the conclusion of the vacation, Michele informed Peter that she and the child would not be returning to Greece. Peter returned to Greece the following day, while Michele and the child remained in Maine with Michele’s family. The child later began attending school and receiving developmental services in Maine.
In July of 2023, Michele filed for divorce in the District Court, seeking dissolution of the marriage, division of the couple’s property, and a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. In April of 2024, after obtaining Maine counsel, Peter filed a petition in the divorce case under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the “Hauge Convention”) seeking return of the child to Greece for a custody determination to take place in that country. Following a hearing, the District Court issued an order denying the petition to return the child to Greece, finding that, while Michele had wrongfully retained the child in Maine, more than a year had passed since the child’s wrongful retention, and the child had since become well-settled in Maine. Peter appealed the District Court’s order denying the petition to the Law Court.
The District Court’s order was interlocutory—Peter’s appeal came prior to the court’s issuance of a final divorce judgment. However, the Law Court concluded that the collateral-order exception justified its review of the interlocutory order. The Court spent the majority of its time discussing the first requirement of the collateral-order exception: that the “the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation.” The Court observed that, under the Hague Convention, “[a] decision. . . concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue,” and accordingly concluded that the Hague Convention claim was “preliminary to and separate from the determination of parental rights and responsibilities.” The Court further noted that there was “no meaningful overlap” between the Hague Convention claim and the remaining divorce and property issues. Based on these conclusions, the Court determined that the Hague Convention claim was separable from the issues to be decided in the divorce action, explaining that claim was “fundamentally about jurisdiction: whether a court in Maine or Greece should hear the custody matter.” This conclusion was buttressed by the Court’s observation that Hague Convention claims are frequently brought as independent actions, separate from any divorce or custody proceedings, and in such a case the order on the petition is considered a final judgment.
The Law Court also found Peter’s appeal met the other prongs of the collateral-order exception. The appeal involved a “major unsettled question of law,” because the Law Court had not previously addressed the relevant provisions of the Hague Convention. And, because if successful in his appeal Peter would be entitled to the immediate return of the child to Greece for a custody determination to take place there, Peter would irreparably lose the right to his child’s return absent immediate review.
Having concluded it could review the District Court’s interlocutory decision, the Law Court ultimately affirmed the District Court’s decision denying Peter’s Hague Convention petition.
While presented in the context of a complex international custody dispute, the Law Court’s decision in Xamplas is not limited to family law matters. Xampas suggests that orders “fundamentally about jurisdiction” may, under certain circumstances, be appealed on an interlocutory basis. Of course, the putative appellant must still meet the second and third requirements of the collateral-order exception, which may prove challenging in less dramatic circumstances.
