Maine

In Board of Overseers v. Brown, the Law Court addressed the timeliness of an appeal following a “motion for clarification” of a judgment.  In doing so, the Law Court drew an interesting distinction between requests for relief that qualify as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) (which toll the appeal deadline) and those that are categorized as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) (which do not toll the appeal deadline).  This distinction poses potential traps for the unwary.

Brown involved a bar complaint against an attorney for violations of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, which led to the imposition of sanctions by a single justice.  Within 14 days of entry of judgment (perhaps not coincidentally, the deadline for a Rule 59(e) motion), the Board of Overseers of the Bar filed a “motion for clarification,” without citing the authority upon which it relied, seeking additional sanctions.  The single justice granted the

The Law Court’s decision in Fournier v. Flats Industrial, Inc., issued last week, provides a stark reminder of the importance of attention to the deadlines for filing an appeal of a final judgment.  The Law Court treats the deadline as jurisdictional, and requires “strict compliance”—even when, as in Fournier, the trial court may not have yet resolved all pending motions before entry of final judgment.

In Fournier, after the Superior Court granted a motion to dismiss two of three counts in the plaintiffs’ complaint, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation voluntarily dismissing the final count together with a motion for a protective order to preserve the confidentiality of certain documents.  The Superior Court granted the motion for protective order four days after the stipulation and motion were filed.  Nineteen days later—importantly, more than 21 days after filing the stipulation of dismissal—the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal relating to the two counts previously dismissed by the

What is the proper remedy when a party challenges a municipal action under Rule 80B, but the court later determines that this was the wrong procedural vehicle to challenge the municipal action?  In Hurricane Island Foundation v. Town of Vinalhaven, the Law Court took a pragmatic approach by treating the proceeding as a declaratory judgment action rather than dismissing the action.

In Hurricane Island Foundation, a nonprofit sought to challenge a town tax assessor’s decision denying the nonprofit a tax abatement.  The nonprofit brought its challenge under Rule 80B.  The Town, however, argued that this was the wrong procedural vehicle because review of an assessor’s decision must be obtained through abatement or declaratory judgment.  The Law Court ultimately agreed, concluding that Rule 80B does not provide for review of a tax assessor’s decision.  This raised an important issue—should the lawsuit be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction?

The Law Court applied a very practical solution. 

Last week the Law Court handed down two decisions relating to judicial process, addressing the time limits for notices of appeal and the situations in which relief can be sought for wrongful use of civil proceedings.

In the first case, Witham v. Board of Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy, a petitioner challenging an agency action failed to timely appeal from a Superior Court decision affirming the agency’s action.  Instead of filing a notice of appeal within 21 days of the court’s judgment, the petitioner did not appeal until 160 days after entry of judgment.  The problem arose because the petitioner never received notice of the Superior Court’s decision; the clerk’s office apparently mailed the judgment, but the postal service did not deliver it.  The problem is, Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 2B provides that the appeal period may only be extended by more than 21 days (but no more than 140 days) if the clerk failed to send the