Death Knells, Due Process, and Democracy: May 2026 Law Court Roundup
A brief introduction from the author: My name is Sage Shaheen and I am a summer associate here at Pierce Atwood. I am a rising 2L at Vermont Law School and, as a long-time reader of the Maine Appeals blog (before ever setting foot at the firm), I am thrilled to now be guest authoring a post. Many thanks to Julia MacDonald and Nolan Reichl for the opportunity to write for the blog, and for the lessons along the way.
With that, here are the notable Law Court decisions from May:
– In re Ballot Challenge in Election of Town of Clifton Select Board Member, 2026 ME 42: This is yet another example of a case in which the Supreme Judicial Court was not “sitting as the Law Court,” but rather exercising a different role (see our previous posts on the varying roles of the Law Court here and here). In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court exercised a special form of original jurisdiction to sit as the trial court, as opposed to its usual appellate role. Under 21-A M.R.S. § 696(1), the Supreme Judicial Court may exercise original jurisdiction to sit as trial court when challenged ballots stand to affect the results of an election.
Here, the validity of two potentially election-altering absentee ballots was questioned. The election was for Select Board members in Clifton, Maine, and the race was tight, with Cynthia Grant ultimately winning the seat with 114 votes (in comparison to her opponent Steve Armenia’s 113 votes). When two unaccounted for absentee ballots were discovered after election results were confirmed, the question arose of whether those ballots must be counted. Clifton citizen Greg Newell challenged the legitimacy of the ballots pursuant to Title 21-A M.R.S. § 673(1) and (3). However, due to the factual and procedural deficiencies therewithin (including the lack of jurat and absence of oath administered by the Ballot Warden, amongst other things), Newell’s petition was dismissed and the court ordered that the ballots be counted.
– Adult Guardianship and Conservatorship of R., 2026 ME 43: This case is interesting because it represents the first time that the Law Court has “expressly [recognized]…that a person subject to guardianship or conservatorship proceedings has a right to the effective assistance of counsel.” The Law Court also took the opportunity to articulate the procedure for challenging a guardianship or conservatorship order based on ineffective assistance of counsel. It noted that the test derived from the Supreme Court case Strickland v. Washington (which established the test for determining whether a criminal defendant’s right to counsel has been violated by that counsel’s ineffective assistance) applies to such proceedings due to the potential for “substantial deprivation of liberty.” 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). This two-factor test requires the petitioner to show both “deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice.”
The Law Court explained that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised via either a motion for relief from judgement or via direct appeal. The primary difference between the two procedures relates to whether the basis for the claim is apparent from the record—when it is, the claim may be raised on direct appeal.
What is remarkable about this case is that the Court ultimately concluded, after applying the Strickland standard, that the appellant’s claim failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the lower court’s decision was upheld. In other words, even though the court could have reached its conclusion without defining the procedure for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a guardianship proceeding, it did so anyway. The Court’s apparent recognition that a right lacks weight without a clear procedural mechanism to obtain a remedy will likely provide welcome clarity to future litigants in similar cases.
– Carissa Daniels v. Patrick R. O’Brien et al., 2026 ME 44: This case involved a claim for timber trespass against a defendant who allegedly cut down trees and bushes on the plaintiff’s property in violation of 14 M.R.S. § 7552. Defendant Patrick O’Brien tendered the defense to his home insurance company, MMG Insurance Co., which proceeded to settle the case with plaintiff Carissa Daniels over O’Brien’s objections. As per the terms of the settlement, Daniels sought to dismiss her claim against O’Brien with prejudice. O’Brien objected because he sought to assert a tort claim against Daniels for wrongful use of civil process, which he could not pursue if the case at hand was settled in favor of Daniels and subsequently dismissed with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice over O’Brien’s objection, and the Law Court affirmed. The Law Court emphasized that it was hard to fathom why a plaintiff should be forced to continue litigating against her will for the “sole purpose of establishing an alleged tort she apparently does not wish to commit.”
– Roberto Valmont-Olivier v. Envirovantage, Inc., 2026 ME 45: This case reached the Law Court through the “death knell exception” to the final judgement rule, which allows for interlocutory appeal of a non-final judgement “only if awaiting a final judgment will cause substantial rights of a party to be irreparably lost” (see our preceding post on the death knell exception here). This exception came into play because the defendant—a New Hampshire company— sought immunity under the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act, 39-A M.R.S. §104, which provides some protection to employers using temporary workers placed through employment agencies. In allowing the appeal to proceed, the Law Court relied on its previous decisions holding that denial of a motion for summary judgment based on a claim of immunity under §104 is immediately appealable under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule. Ultimately, the Law Court concluded that the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act was inapplicable to the case because the action—brought by a temporary worker from Massachusetts who was injured on a job site in Maine—was governed by Massachusetts law. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the New Hampshire company’s motion for summary judgment.
– Tidewater Loft Condominium Association v. Judith L. Moskal-Kanz, 2026 ME 46: In this case, the Law Court vacated a judgment in favor of plaintiff Tidewater Condo Association on multiple claims due to the lower court’s failure to uphold the defendant’s due process rights. In response to a complaint for the foreclosure and sale of her condominium unit in Old Orchard Beach, defendant Judith Moskal-Kanz, appearing pro se, asserted counterclaims which invoked the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Though the trial court had previously identified her counterclaims as issues to be addressed at trial, at a bench trial in May 2025 Moskal-Kanz was prevented from producing evidence that would support her counterclaim. Instead, the District Court permitted only litigation of the foreclosure issues, and ultimately found in favor of Tidewater Condo Association on both the foreclosure issue and the counterclaim posed by Moskal-Kanz. Confoundingly, despite its conclusion that the counterclaim was “not part of [the] trial” and its subsequent refusal to allow evidence on the counterclaim, the lower court found that Moskal-Kanz had “presented no persuasive evidence” in support of her counterclaim. To rectify the lower court’s due process violation, the Law Court vacated not only the judgment on the counterclaim but also the judgment of foreclosure, noting that “unresolved counterclaims are often inextricably intertwined with the merits of the complaint.” The case was subsequently remanded to the District Court.
– Mitchell D. Brown v. Diahanne L. Morse et al., 2026 ME 51: In this case, the substance of which relates to the management of a trust by defendant Diahanne Morse, the Law Court once again applied the final judgment rule. In the proceedings below, the Superior Court entered an order purporting to constitute its “final judgment in th[e] matter.” However, while the order addressed the four counts of plaintiff Mitchell Brown’s original complaint as well as the defendant’s counterclaims, the order made no mention of three additional counts that had been added to the case by Brown in an amended complaint. On Morse’s appeal of the order, the Law Court recognized that the lower court had intended to fully resolve all issues in the case, but the Law Court emphasized that a trial court’s intent is irrelevant when analyzing whether an order constitute a “final judgment.” The Law Court concluded that the lower court had not addressed and disposed of the entire matter before it and accordingly concluded that the order appealed from was not in fact a final judgment.
Because the lower court’s decision did not constitute a final judgment, the Law Court next analyzed whether the decision might fit within one of the exceptions to the final judgment rule. The Court first denied the applicability of the death knell and collateral order exceptions, noting that there was no irreparable loss of rights to either the plaintiff or the defendant. The Court next addressed the judicial economy exception, rejecting this in turn due to the substantial unlikelihood that a decision from the Law Court would result in “final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation.” As such, resolution of Morse’s appeal would only serve to “condone the parties’ efforts to engage in ‘piecemeal litigation.’” The Law Court thus dismissed Morse’s appeal as interlocutory.
– Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2019-4 v. Leslie Bodwell et al., 2026 ME 50: This case is noteworthy because, like the Roberto Valmont-Olivier v. Envirovantage, Inc. case discussed above, it also involved an interlocutory appeal which reached the Law Court through the “death knell exception” to the final judgement rule. The case involved an appeal of an order finding that the subject property (which was subject to foreclosure) was abandoned, and appointing a receiver to control, market, and sell the property. The appellant—a party-in-interest to the litigation who had a security interest in the property—challenged the appellee’s ownership interest in the property, and alleged the appellee lacked standing to seek foreclosure and the appointment of a receiver. While the Law Court did not go into great depth in explaining its reasoning for allowing the case to proceed, the Court appeared to recognize that sale of a property prior to the conclusion of litigation would cause irreparable harm to a party challenging the sale and accordingly allowed the appeal to go forward despite being interlocutory.
